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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court in Carey v. Piphus declared that the funda-
mental purpose of a civil rights award is to compensate individuals for
injuries caused by the deprivation of their constitutional rights.1
While a court declaration that one's constitutional rights have been
violated is valuable in and of itself, it is the existence of these reme-
dies that is the crucial tool in protecting individuals from being in-
jured permanently' and that serves as a strong deterrent against fu-
ture action.' Because compensatory damages are such a powerful
tool, plaintiffs are required to demonstrate that a defendant's actions
not only deprived them of their constitutional rights, but also caused
an "actual injury,"4 including impairment of reputation, personal
humiliation, mental anguish, or physical injury.5
Prior to 1996, prisoners were capable of recovering compensatory
damages for those constitutional deprivations at the hands of prison
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Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-54 (1978).
See id. at 254 ("Rights, constitutional and otherwise, do not exist in a vacuum. Their pur-
pose is to protect persons from injuries to particular interests . . ").
3 See id. at 256-57 ("To the extent that Congress intended that awards under § 1983 should
deter the deprivation of constitutional rights, there is no evidence that it meant to establish a
deterrent more formidable than that inherent in the award of compensatory damages.").
See id. at 255 (requiring plaintiffs to prove that the action both violated their constitu-
tional rights and caused a compensable injury).
5 See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 307 (1986) (finding that out-of-
pocket losses and other monetary harms are not the only injuries considered for purposes of
compensatory damages).
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officials that caused actual injuries. Although a prisoner's civil rights
were certainly diminished by the exigencies of incarceration, an indi-
vidual, upon becoming a prisoner, was not "wholly stripped of consti-
tutional protections. 6 However, the passing of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act ("PLRA") in 1996 changed this structure, significantly
curtailing prisoners' abilities to bring lawsuits and to remedy viola-
tions of their constitutional rights.
The PLRA contains a number of provisions' that each make it sub-
stantially more difficult for prisoners to utilize the judicial system.
While several of these have been criticized for stripping prisoners'
rights,' the most controversial and most heavily litigated section has
been the PLRA's ban on actions for mental or emotional injury in the
absence of physical injury. Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e), the pro-
vision has worked to bar such constitutional claims as violations of
free exercise of religion, 9 racial discrimination, 0 and invasion of pri-
vacy," regardless of whether the prisoner suffered an actual injury.
To counteract this drastic effect, many courts have held that
§ 1997e(e) precludes only compensatory damages, leaving open the
possibility of awarding nominal or punitive damages.1
This Comment argues that despite the potential for alternative re-
lief in the form of nominal or punitive damages, § 1997e(e) is uncon-
stitutional as violating the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. First, due to the high standard for punitive damages and the
requirement in some courts that the prisoner specifically plead nomi-
nal damages, prisoners are rarely awarded this alternative relief.
Since an award of nominal damages under § 1997e(e) works in con-
junction with the limitation on attorneys' fees, indigent prisoners
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67
BROOK. L. REv. 429, 430 (2001-02) (arguing that the PLRA is about "litigant stripping"); Robert
L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Expression: A Speech-Centered
Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835, 889-90 (2002) (arguing that § 1997e(d) violates the
First Amendment).
9 See, e.g., Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876-77 (10th Cir. 2001) (barring claim for
compensatory damages for infringement of First Amendment right to free exercise of religion,
because the complainant sought mental or emotional injury without a showing of physical in-
jury); Allah v. A-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (denying recovery of compensatory
damages for alleged infringement of First Amendment rights where appellant could not show
actual physical injury).
'0 See, e.g., Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958, 961 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (barring claim for
compensatory damages for emotional or mental injuries arising out of an alleged Fourteenth
Amendment violation).
" See, e.g., Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (precluding
recovery on claim alleging violation of right to privacy where there was no proof of prior physi-
cal injury).
" See infra Part I.D for an analysis of the availability of alternative damages.
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have lost their best mechanism for being able to proceed with the as-
sistance of counsel. Finally, in taking away compensatory damages for
non-physical injuries, Congress has significantly changed the consti-
tutional tort remedies structure as set forth by Carey and its progeny,
thus creating an irreparable hole in civil rights law.
Part I of this Comment provides a background on prisoner civil
rights and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, and examines the vari-
ous circuits' interpretations of the mental/emotional damages provi-
sion and the availability of nominal and punitive damages. Part II
discusses the tendency of lower courts to engage in constitutional
avoidance as a method of circumventing constitutional scrutiny of
§ 1997e(e) while ensuring that a judicial forum remains open to ad-
judicate egregious constitutional violations. Part III discusses the
constitutional deficiencies of § 1997e(e), arguing that the PLRA vio-
lates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.13 Part IV
argues that the availability of nominal and punitive damages does not
cure the unconstitutionality of § 1997e(e). Finally, Part V maintains
that § 1997e(e) must be struck down as unconstitutional, but that
Congress's purpose in enacting the PLRA may be accomplished
through its other provisions and through reliance on the competence
of federal judges to screen prisoner lawsuits for dishonest motives.
I. BACKGROUND OF PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS SUITS
A. The Law Prior to Enactment of the PLRA
Civil rights lawsuits are commonly brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, which provides legal and equitable remedies against any per-
son who "under color of any statute, ordinance, custom, or usage, of
any State.. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws. Section 1983 does
not provide a source of substantive rights, but is instead a mechanism
under which one can assert federal rights granted by the Constitution
" See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury... ; nor shall any per-
son be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."). While the Fifth Amendment does not expressly contain an equal protec-
tion clause, the Supreme Court has held that it forbids discrimination that is "so unjustifiable as
to be violative of due process" and thus provides the same equal protection as the Fourteenth
Amendment. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975) (quoting Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964)).
,4 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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or other federal laws.'" Indeed, § 1983 is the primary means by which
people vindicate their civil rights. 6
Until the late 1960s, it was unclear whether prisoners retained any
constitutional rights upon incarceration. Federal courts adopted a
"hands off" policy with regard to prisoner civil rights lawsuits and
consistently deferred to the authority of prison administrators."
However, in Cooper v. Pate, the Supreme Court changed course and
allowed a prisoner to bring a § 1983 action for infringement of his
constitutional rights. 9 In Wolff v. McDonnell, the Court held that al-
though incarceration necessarily causes citizens to lose many rights
and privileges, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of all constitutional
protection:
There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons
of this country. Prisoners have been held to enjoy substantial religious
freedom under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. They retain right
of access to the courts. Prisoners are protected under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination
based on race. Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Proc-
ess Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law.
Despite this willingness to become involved in cases of fundamen-
tal constitutional violations, the Court has made clear that in most
cases prisoners do not retain the same level of protection as ordinary
citizens. To balance the concern for protecting prisoners' funda-
mental rights with the need for deference to prison administration
'5 See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) ("It is for violations of such constitu-
tional and statutory fights that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 authorizes redress; that section is... a method
for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred .... .").
" See, e.g.,JOHN C.JEFFRIES ET AL., CIvIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: ENFORCING THE CONSTITUTION 42
(2000) (finding that since Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), in which the Court vindicated
the use of § 1983 as a mechanism for enforcing one's constitutional rights, the number of suits
brought under § 1983 jumped from 300 in the year of Monroe, to more than 43,000 suits in
1998).
17 See MICHAEL MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS § 1:02, at 7 (2d ed. 1993) ("[D] uring most of
the history of this country, there was some question as to whether prisoners had any constitu-
tional rights at all.... The so-called hands-off doctrine precluded judges from ever reaching the
question of what rights survived incarceration.").
" See Gilmore v. California, 220 F.3d 987, 991 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Although asked to intervene
on behalf of prisoners, federal courts systematically declined under the so-called 'hands off doc-
trine,' a rule of judicial quiescence derived from federalism and separation of powers con-
cerns."); see also James E. Robertson, Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A
"Not Exactly, "Equal Protection Analysis, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105, 108-09 (2000) (describing the
justifications advanced by the courts for the doctrine, including the "lack of expertise in penal
administration; the potential for undermining the authority of correctional staff; the fear of
triggering a flood of inmate lawsuits; and adherence to the principles of federalism").
" Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1963) (reversing dismissal of § 1983 claim challenging dis-
crimination on the basis of the prisoner's religious beliefs).
" Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) (citations omitted).
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and institutional security, courts apply a form of intermediate review
to constitutional challenges by prisoners. 2' A prison regulation that
infringes on a prisoner's constitutional rights will be upheld if it is
"reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."22
B. Enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act
The PLRA was enacted in response to complaints of an over-
whelming number of frivolous lawsuits burdening the federal judici-
ary and wasting legal and financial resources.23 Indeed, statistics indi-
cate a nearly ten-fold increase in prisoner civil rights lawsuits in just
the four years after the Court began recognizing prisoners' rights-
from 218 filings in 1966 to more than 2000 in 1970.24 In 1993, pris-
oner appeals constituted approximately 13,000 of the 32,000 civil ap-
peals filed.25 This litigation "explosion 2 6 and the increasing involve-
" See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) ("[P]rison regulations alleged to
infringe constitutional rights are judged under a 'reasonableness' test less restrictive than that
ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights."). However,
the Supreme Court in Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141 (2005), recently held that strict scru-
tiny continues to apply in prison cases involving racial classifications, while the lesser protection
applies in all other prisoner constitutional torts suits. The Court noted that
[t]he need for strict scrutiny is no less important here, where prison officials cite racial
violence as the reason for their policy....
The fight not to be discriminated against based on one's race is .... not a right that
need necessarily be compromised for the sake of proper prison administration. On the
contrary, compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment's ban on racial discrimination is
not only consistent with proper prison administration, but also bolsters the legitimacy of
the entire criminal justice system.
Id. at 1147, 1149.
22 OLone, 482 U.S. at 349 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). In OLone, the
Court upheld a prison regulation that prevented Islamic inmates from attending weekly Friday
religious services after finding that the policy was related to legitimate security and order con-
cerns. Id. at 350-51.
2" See, e.g., Letter from Nat'l Ass'n of Attorneys Gen. to Senator Bob Dole (Sept. 19, 1995),
141 CONG. REC. S14, 417-18 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) ("[Tlhe issue of frivolous inmate litiga-
tion has been a major priority of this Association .... [W]e estimate that inmate civil rights suits
cost states at least $81.3 million per year. Experience ... suggests that, while all of these cases
are not frivolous, more than 95 percent of inmate civil rights suits are dismissed without the
inmate receiving anything.").
2. JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE PARADOX OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER 110 tbl.5d
(1988).
21 Gigette M. Bejin, The 1995 Legislation for Prisoner Litigation Reform: Has the Pendulum Swung
the Other Way?, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 557, 558 (1997) (citing a study by the Federal Judiciary
Center); see also Seth F. Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter ofJudicial Review: A Constitutional Cen-
sus of the 1990s, 5 WM & MARY BILL RTS.J. 427, 485 (1997) (reporting that "[b]etween 1894 and
1994, prisoner civil rights cases and habeas petitions increased from one-tenth to almost one-
fifth of the federal civil [trial court] docket").
'6 While the raw number of prisoners filing suits was dramatically increasing, Professor
Robertson claims that this "explosion" is really a half-truth: the absolute number of filings be-
tween 1980 and 1996 grew because of rapid growth in the prison population, while the rate of
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ment of the judiciary in the operations of prisons27 led to the enact-
ment of the PLRA as a means of addressing the growing number of
what were perceived to be frivolous lawsuits.
In enacting the PLRA, Congress was overtly concerned with law-
suits involving conditions of imprisonment that were filed in response
to "almost any perceived slight or inconvenience. '' 9 Such suits in-
cluded claims of insufficient locker space, a poor haircut given by a
prison barber, being served chunky instead of creamy peanut butter,
prison officials failing to invite a prisoner to a pizza party, being de-
nied use of a Gameboy video game, and being issued Converse-brand
shoes instead of Reebok or L.A. Gear.0 Indeed, the Senators repeat-
edly claimed that the PLRA would not prevent legitimate constitu-
tional claims from being litigated and redressed. 1
Section 1997e(e) provides that "[n]o Federal civil action may be
brought by a prisoner confined in ajail, prison, or other correctional
filings per 1000 inmates actually decreased seventeen percent. See Robertson, supra note 18, at
142; see also Kreimer, supra note 25, at 485 (noting that the overall rate of civil rights litigation
per prisoner has remained approximately the same during the 1980s and 1990s).
" See 141 CONG. REc. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("It is
past time to slam shut the revolving door on the prison gate and to put the key safely out of
reach of overzealous Federal courts. ... I believe that the courts have gone too far in micro-
managing our Nation's prisons."); 141 CONG. REC. S14, 317 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (state-
ment of Sen. Abraham) ("[These reforms] will discourage judges from seeking to take control
over our prison systems, and to micromanage them, right down to the brightness of their
lights.").
According to Senator Orrin Hatch, 3.1% of cases have enough validity to reach trial, thus
indicating that 97% of prisoner suits are without merit. 141 CONG. REC. S14, 418 (daily ed.
Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch). But see Theodore Eisenberg & Steward Schwab, The
Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 692 & n.207 (1987) (finding that
pro se prisoners succeed in 15% of cases and counseled prisoners succeed in 53% of cases when
success is defined not only as a trial victory, but also as settlement, stipulated dismissal, and vol-
untary dismissal by plaintiff).
141 CONG. REc. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("Today's sys-
tem seems to encourage prisoners to file with impunity. After all, it's free. And a courtroom is
certainly a more hospitable place to spend an afternoon than a prison cell."). Although Con-
gress claimed to be concerned about an overwhelming number of suits over prison conditions,
District Court Judge William Wayne Justice noted that prisoner complaints generally fall into
four main areas: guard brutality, lack of medical care, extreme overcrowding, and summary
discipline. Judge Justice failed to mention cases challenging conditions of confinement as fre-
quenting his docket. William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-
5 (1990).
" 141 CONG. REC. S14, 412-18 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statements of Sen. Dole, Sen.
Hatch, and Sen. Kyl). But seeJon 0. Newman, Pro Se Litigation: Looking for Needles in Haystacks,
62 BROOK. L. REv. 519, 520-22 (1996) (arguing that these cases have been distorted by Attorney
Generals and politicians and were not as frivolous as publicized; rather, they were based upon
real legal arguments).
" 141 CONG. REc. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl) ("[P]risoners
still have the right to seek legal redress for meritorious claims.... ."); 141 CONG. REC. S14, 317
(daily ed. Sept. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (assuring that the PLRA would actually
"help protect convicted criminals' constitutional rights").
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facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury."32  In addition to
§ 1997e(e), the PLRA includes a number of other provisions govern-
ing prisoners' ability to bring suit. Included among these require-
ments are: (1) requiring that a prisoner exhaust all administrative
remedies before filing § 1983 actions or otherwise face dismissal of
the lawsuit; 3 (2) requiring plaintiffs to either pay the initial filing fee
or make monthly installment payments from their personal accounts
when bringing suits in forma pauperis ("IFP") ;34 (3) prohibiting a
prisoner from filing a suit IFP after having three previous suits or ap-
peals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim, ab-
sent a showing of "imminent danger of serious physical injury";35 and
(4) limiting the awarding of attorneys' fees for successful prisoner
claims to 150% of the damages award.6
The PLRA, which passed as a rider to an omnibus appropriations
bill,3 7 has been criticized as being the result of a rushed enactment
that was subject to little congressional debate. s Senator Edward
Kennedy complained that "[t]he PLRA was the subject of a single
hearing in the Judiciary Committee, hardly the type of thorough re-
view that a measure of this scope deserves." 9 Section 1997e (e), in
particular, received the least amount of congressional deliberation,0
" 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2000). The PLRA failed to define physical injury. However, courts
have largely interpreted the provision to require that a physical injury be more than de minimis,
although it need not be significant. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003)
(finding that deprivation of food, drink, and sleep does not satisfy the de minimis requirement
of a physical injury); Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191,193 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that a sore,
bruised ear is not more than de minimis).
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000).
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (2000). This provision is significant because nearly all prisoners file
in forma pauperis. See THOMAS, supra note 24, at 157 (reporting that 98% of all prisoner civil
rights cases are filed IFP). As prisoners are perhaps the most impoverished group in the United
States, paying a filing fee of $105 or $150 bars many prisoners from suing, regardless of the po-
tential seriousness of the constitutional violation. See Boston, supra note 8, at 430, 433 ("Paying
off such fees of those amounts over a period of time when they are getting paid pennies an
hour, or nothing, for their labor, or... [have] no opportunity to work, is a daunting proposi-
tion.... This provision is more than a nuisance or even a hardship. It is an absolute bar-
rier .. .. ").
' 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2000).
26 42 U.S.C. § 1997(d) (2000).
17 See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 727 (8th Cir. 2004) (describing the history of the
PLRA).
" See, e.g., Jason E. Pepe, Challenging Congress's Latest Attempt to Confine Prisoners' Constitutional
Rights: Equal Protection and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 58, 62 (1999)
("The bill was not subject to committee mark-up. The judiciary committee did not furnish a
committee report detailing the PLRA's effects.... Notwithstanding the absence of deliberate
debate, the PLRA became law.").
" 142 CONG. REC. S22, 96 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
40 See Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1325 (S.D. Ind. 1997) ("The legislative history con-
tains virtually no discussion specifically concerning ... § 1997e (e).").
Mar. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
with the only specific mention of the provision in the congressional
debates being a paraphrase from the actual statute's language.41
C. Interpretation of § 1997e(e) Given by Federal Circuits
Section 1997e(e) has been one of the most litigated provisions of
the PLRA with substantially conflicting interpretations and varying
outcomes. Courts have encountered the most difficulty in determin-
ing the precise scope where the prisoner alleges deprivation of a con-
stitutional right, particularly for violations of the First, Fourth,
Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
A court's construction of the PLRA often depends on which por-
tion of § 1997e(e)'s language it chooses to emphasize. Courts that
focus on the provision's "for mental or emotional injury" language
hold that § 1997e(e) does not apply to constitutional torts as they are
not claims for mental or emotional damages, but are claims for viola-
tions of "intangible and invaluable rights whose deprivation is an in-
jury in and of itself."42 This construction was first articulated in Canell
v. Lightner, in which the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action for viola-
tions of his First Amendment establishment and free exercise rights
after a correctional officer actively sought to convert inmates to his
Christian faithY. The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant's argu-
ment that the claim was alleging only mental or emotional injury
without the requisite physical injury, holding instead that "depriva-
tion of First Amendment rights entitles a plaintiff to judicial relief
wholly aside from any physical injury he can show, or any mental or
emotional injury he may have incurred."44
Under this interpretation, courts find that the physical damages
requirement cannot apply to all federal civil actions because other-
wise, "for mental or emotional injury" would simply be superfluous
language. 5 Instead, courts look to whether the plaintiff is claiming
that the defendant's actions caused injuries of "stress, fear, depres-
41 See 141 CONG. REc. S14, 414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (remarks of Sen. Dole) ("And it
prohibits prisoners from suing the Government for mental and emotional injury, absent a prior
showing of physical injury.").
4 Royal, 375 F.3d at 729 (Heaney,J., dissenting); see also Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781-82
(7th Cir. 1999) (finding that the deprivation of a First Amendment right to receive mail is a
"cognizable injury" on its own and, thus, plaintiff's claim was dismissed because it was not "for"
emotional or mental injury).
" Canell v. Lightner, 143 F.3d 1210, 1211-12 (9th Cir. 1998).
" Id. at 1213.
See Amaker v. Haponik, No. 98 Civ. 2663, 1999 WL 76798, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 1999)
("The defendants' reading of the statute would require that a prisoner have sustained physical
injury before bringing any federal civil suit. That reading would render superfluous the qualify-
ing language 'for mental or emotional injury' and would be contrary to the well-established
principle that all words in a statute should be read to have meaning.").
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sion, and other psychological impacts,"46 or is claiming that the ac-
tions deprived him of his First Amendment or other constitutional
rights. Only where a claim specifically alleges injuries of those psy-
chological impacts will that portion of the claim be barred by
§ 1997e(e). 7 These courts find that this interpretation is consistent
with the express legislative intent of decreasing the number of frivo-
lous lawsuits, while still protecting legitimate constitutional claims . 4
However, the majority of circuits have held that the physical injury
requirement does apply to constitutional torts.4 9 These courts focus
on the statute's "no Federal civil action" language, arguing that the
word "no" indicates that Congress did not intend there to be any ex-
ceptions to the physical injury requirement.5° Since the language of
' Id. (concluding that the term "mental or emotional injury" must be defined according to
its "well understood meaning" instead of automatically assuming that since the claim does not
allege a physical injury, it must be asserting a mental or emotional injury).
'7 The Seventh Circuit in Robinson v. Page, 170 F.3d 747 (1999), held that where a suit in-
volves two separate claims with neither involving physical injury, and one claim is for damages
for mental and emotional suffering and the other seeks damages for another type of injury,
§ 1997e(e) only bars the first claim. Id. at 749. Under this interpretation, if a suit alleged that
the defendant's actions were (1) depriving a plaintiff of his First Amendment rights, and (2)
causing psychological distress, only the claim of psychological distress would be dismissed.
48 See Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 718-19 (W.D. Mo. 1999) ("Congress was con-
cerned about frivolous lawsuits by inmates arising from their conditions of confine-
ment .... There is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to dra-
matically limit available judicial remedies for such historically actionable claims ...."). Mason
was criticized and possibly overruled by Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2004).
,9 See, e.g., Roya4 375 F.3d 720 (applying § 1997e(e) to a suit claiming violation of the First
Amendment and the constitutional right of access to the courts); Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d
411 (2d Cir. 2002) (violation of Eighth Amendment); Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869 (10th
Cir. 2001) (violation of First Amendment); Allah v. A1-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (vio-
lation of First Amendment); Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1999) (violation of
Eighth Amendment); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (violation of
equal protection and the right to privacy); Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958 (S.D. Iowa 2002)
(violation of Fourteenth Amendment as governs racial discrimination).
0 These courts view § 1997e(e) as having plain and unambiguous language, and therefore
follow the rule of refusing to permit alteration from the strict wording of the statute. See United
States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th Cir. 2000) ("If the plain language of the statute is
unambiguous, that language is conclusive absent clear legislative intent to the contrary. There-
fore, if the intent of Congress can be clearly discerned from the statute's language, the judicial
inquiry must end."); see, e.g., Roya4 375 F.3d at 723 ("[We] conclud[e] [that] Congress did not
intend section 1997e(e) to limit recovery only to a select group of federal actions brought by
prisoners.... In reaching this conclusion, we cannot escape the unmistakably clear language
Congress used .... To read this statute to exempt First Amendment claims would require us to
interpret 'no Federal civil action' to mean 'no Federal civil action [except for First Amendment
violations].' If Congress desires such a reading of section 1997e(e), Congress can certainly say
so. We cannot."); Thompson, 284 F.3d at 417 (finding that since "the words '[f]ederal civil ac-
tion' are not qualified," physical injury is required for claims of Due Process Clause and Eighth
Amendment violations); Searles, 251 F.3d at 876 (holding that the plain language of § 1997e(e)
"does not permit alteration of its clear damages restrictions on the basis of the underlying rights
being asserted"); Cassidy v. Ind. Dep't of Corr., 199 F.3d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding the
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§ 1997e(e) makes no distinction between various types of claims and
"[is] not qualified, [it] include [s] federal civil actions brought to vin-
dicate constitutional rights."51
This interpretation treats the constitutional deprivation not as an
injury in and of itself but as the "underlying substantive violation."52
Relying on Carey, these courts find that a plaintiff cannot receive
compensatory damages without proving an actual injury.53 However,
they reason that since a compensable injury is categorically limited to
physical or emotional injuries under general tort law,54 the plaintiff
must be asserting a claim for mental or emotional injury when not al-
leging physical injury.5
D. Availability of Nominal Damages and Punitive Damages
Those courts that interpret the PLRA as encompassing constitu-
tional torts nearly uniformly have held, in dicta at least, that
§ 1997e(e) applies exclusively to claims for compensatory damages
while leaving open the possibility of nominal or punitive damages
awards56 or the issuing of equitable relief.5  In Allah v. Al-Hafeez, the
language of § 1997e(e) to be plain and unambiguous and thus refusing to carve out exceptions
not indicated by Congress).
51 Thompson, 284 F.3d at 417 (barring compensatory damages for an Eighth Amendment
violation claim of deliberate indifference and improper confiscation of medication).
12 See Searles, 251 F.3d at 876 ("The underlying substantive violation ... should not be di-
vorced from the resulting injury, such as 'mental or emotional injury,' thus avoiding the clear
mandate of § 1997e(e). The statute limits the remedies available, regardless of the rights as-
serted ... ").
53 See Carey v. Piphus, 425 U.S. 247, 255 (1978) (requiring that the constitutional depriva-
tion cause an actual injury in order to recover compensatory damages).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 905 (1979) ("Compensatory damages that may be
awarded without proof of pecuniary loss include compensation (a) for bodily harm, and (b) for
emotional distress.").
55 See Allah v. A1-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) ("[Plaintiff] seeks substantial dam-
ages for the harm he suffered as a result of defendants' alleged violation of his First Amend-
ment right to free exercise of religion.... [T]he only actual injury that could form the basis for
the award he seeks would be mental and/or emotional injury.").
See, e.g., Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming the trial court's
award of one dollar after finding that defendant violated plaintiffs First Amendment rights);
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[R]egardless [of] how we construe
§ 1997e(e)'s physical injury requirement, it will not affect [plaintiff]'s ability to seek nominal or
punitive damages for violations of his constitutional rights."); Thompson, 284 F.3d at 418 (find-
ing that § 1997e(e) does not limit the availability of nominal or punitive damages); Searles, 251
F.3d at 879 ("[W]e now hold that § 1997e(e) does not bar recovery of nominal damages for vio-
lations of prisoners' rights.").
'7 See, e.g., Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 2001) ("The prohibitive feature of
§ 1997e(e), requiring physical injury before recovery, does not apply in the context of requests
for declaratory or injunctive relief sought to end an allegedly unconstitutional condition of con-
finement."); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Section 1997e(e) refers to
claims for injuries 'suffered.' Use of the past tense indicates that the provision constitutes a
limitation on a damages remedy only, and does not impair a prisoner's right to seek declaratory
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Third Circuit held that claims seeking nominal and punitive damages
were not "for" mental or emotional injury, but rather "to vindicate a
constitutional right or to punish for violation of that right," and
therefore were not barred.5 The court relied heavily on the Supreme
Court's directive in both Carey and Memphis Community School District
v. Stachura that nominal damages are available to vindicate constitu-
tional violations in the absence of an actual injury.59 Since plaintiffs
were barred by the PLRA from showing mental or emotional injury,
the court deemed nominal damages to be an appropriate measure of
relief.60 The Third Circuit further held that punitive damages may be
awarded solely based on a constitutional violation as punishment for
willful or malicious conduct and deterrence for future behavior, pro-
vided that the plaintiff makes the proper showing.61
Among the courts leaving open the possibility of nominal dam-
ages, however, there is a division about whether the prisoner-plaintiff
must actually plead the nominal damages,62 or whether nominal dam-
ages may be automatically considered in the constitutional tort con-
text. 3 While the District of Columbia Circuit in Davis v. District of Co-
and injunctive relief for constitutional violations."); Perkins v. Kan. Dep't of Corr., 165 F.3d 803,
808 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that § 1997e(e) does not affect actions for injunctive or declara-
tive relief); see infra note 135 for further discussion of the availability of equitable relief. This
Comment focuses solely on the availability of nominal and punitive damages, leaving the avail-
ability of equitable relief for future commentary.
Allah, 226 F.3d at 252.
Id. at 251 ("[T]he Supreme Court recognized in both Carey and Stachura that certain abso-
lute constitutional rights may be vindicated by an award of nominal damages in the absence of
any showing of injury warranting compensatory damages.").
o Id. at 251-53.
61 Id. at 251 (finding that in order to be awarded punitive damages under § 1983, a plaintiff
must show that "defendant's conduct [was] motivated by evil motive or intent, or [involved]
reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others" (quoting Coleman v.
Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1497 (3d Cir. 1996))).
62 Few civil rights plaintiffs actually plead nominal damages; instead they typically request
compensatory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees. Mark T. Morrell, Comment,
Who Wants Nominal Damages Anyway? The Impact of an Automatic Entitlement to Nominal Damages
Under § 1983, 13 REGENT U. L. REv. 225, 236 (2000-01) (analyzing the impact of Carey under a
general § 1983 action). Since the majority of prisoners-plaintiffs proceed pro se, it is likely that
prisoners largely fail to plead nominal damages. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, BUREAU OFJUSTICE
STATISTICS, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983
LITIGATION (1994), http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/ccopaj.txt (reporting that 96% of
prisoners proceed pro se).
This same disagreement occurred in the non-prisoner context after the Supreme Court's
declaration in Carey that individuals are entitled to nominal awards for constitutional violations.
Some courts require plaintiffs to specifically request nominal damages in the pleadings phase,
others permit plaintiffs to request nominal damages after the jury verdict, and still others hold
that nominal damages must be awarded regardless of whether plaintiffs specifically sought
them. Compare Westcott v. Crinklaw, 133 F.3d 658, 664 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district
court erred in instructing the jury on the availability of nominal damages where the plaintiff did
not seek a nominal award and such relief would be wholly inadequate), with Campos-Orrego v.
Rivera, 175 F.3d 89, 99 (1st Cir. 1999) (allowing the plaintiff to request nominal damages after
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lumbia implied that a prisoner may be entitled to nominal damages in
certain cases, it nonetheless dismissed the suit because the plaintiff
never sought nominal damages in his pleadings and only raised the
issue at oral argument. 64 In contrast, the Third Circuit in Mitchell v.
Horn held that the fact that the plaintiffs did not expressly seek
nominal damages in their complaint was insignificant, as "it is not
necessary to allege nominal damages., 65 Finally, the Second Circuit
takes a middle-ground approach by allowing its pro se prisoners to
amend their complaints in order to specifically request nominal
damages on remand. 6
Despite the willingness of most circuits to allow for punitive dam-
ages, this allowance is not universal. In particular, the Davis court
expressly found that § 1997e(e) bars punitive damages:
Amicus argues that because punitive damages are awarded to
punish the tortfeasor rather than to compensate the victim,
they are not embraced by § 1997e(e). But § 1997e(e) draws no
such distinction. It simply prevents suits "for" mental injury
without prior physical injury. As the purposes of compensatory
awards themselves are multifaceted (including, for example,
deterrence), it can hardly be the case that, when a suit alleges
only mental or emotional injury, the presence of additional
purposes makes a suit not "for" the injuries alleged.
The Davis court further found that the purpose behind the PLRA
would be thwarted if prisoners could evade § 1997e (e) by simply add-
ing a claim for punitive damages and asserting that the defendant
acted maliciously.6
the jury verdict), with Floyd v. Laws, 929 F.2d 1390, 1401 (9th Cir. 1990) (asserting that a plain-
tiff is entitled to nominal damages as a matter of law).
Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1349 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also Harris v. Gar-
ner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) ("We express no view on whether section
1997e(e) would bar an action for nominal damages that are normally available for the violation
of certain 'absolute' constitutional fights, without any showing of actual injury. Plaintiffs have
not sought nominal damages in this case, and so we do not address the issue.") (citation omit-
ted).
Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 533 n.8 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d
74, 87 (3d Cir. 1965)); see also Allah, 226 F.3d at 251 ("Construing [plaintiffs] pro se complaint
liberally, we interpret Allah's complaint to request nominal damages.").
See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2002) ("The liberal pleading standards
applicable to pro se civil rights complaints.., required that the district court give Thompson an
opportunity to flesh out his somewhat skeletal complaints... [and] file an amended complaint
in which he should make clear the nature of any damages he seeks. .. ").
67 Davis, 158 F.3d at 1348; see also Harris, 190 F.3d at 1286-87 (affirming trial court's dis-
missal of punitive damages claim where there was no physical injury); Odom v. Poirier, No. 99
Civ. 4933, 2004 WL 2884409, at *1 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2004) ("As plaintiff's complaint is de-
void of any allegation of physical injury, plaintiff's request for punitive damages is denied.").
Davis, 158 F.3d at 1348. While the court did not expressly bar the awarding of nominal
damages where no physical injury could be proved, it would seem that under this reasoning
nominal damages would also fall under the reach of § 1997e (e).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE AS A MECHANISM TO
CIRCUMVENT BOTH § 1997E (E) 'S POTENTIAL EFFECTS
AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY QUESTION
Strict construction of § 1997e(e) lends itself to harsh results that
appear to sanction the commission of constitutional torts against
prisoners. Not only may the strict construction leave a prisoner with-
out the ability to invoke judicial power to protect his fundamental
rights, but it also sends a powerful message to prison authorities that
they may engage in constitutional wrongdoing without fear ofjudicial
penalty. Regardless of the constitutional implications,69 lower courts
often avoid determining the constitutionality of § 1997e(e) 70 and, in-
stead, counteract the potentially damaging consequences of the pro-
vision by finding alternative mechanisms for adjudicating cases in-
volving constitutional torts. This judicial avoidance manifests itself in
two ways: (1) by exempting constitutional torts from the reach of
§ 1997e(e), and (2) by finding that § 1997e(e) does not preclude a
prisoner from having his rights adjudicated, but only bars an award of
compensatory damages.
The minority of courts that have allowed constitutional torts to
survive § 1997e(e) have done so not on the basis of the statute's un-
constitutionality but rather by simply holding that allegations of con-
stitutional violations are not claims "for" mental or emotional injury
and are thus outside the purview of § 1997e(e) ' The Seventh Circuit
0 See infra Part III for an analysis of the constitutional implications of § 1997e (e).
'0 The reason for such judicial avoidance of § 1997e (e)'s constitutionality likely stems from
the difficulty in striking a statute down as violating equal protection. A statute will typically only
be struck down as unconstitutional under a heightened standard of review (strict scrutiny or an
intermediate level), which requires the action to impinge on a fundamental right or discrimi-
nate against a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See infra notes 95-98 and accompanying text. How-
ever, courts are rather reluctant to find that an action impinges on a fundamental right or to
name a new suspect class, so heightened scrutiny is infrequently employed to find violations of
equal protection. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986) ("Nor are we in-
clined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause.... There should be, therefore, great resistance to ex-
pand the substantive reach of those Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of
rights deemed to be fundamental."). Courts are even more reluctant to strike down a statute
under a rational basis standard of review. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text; see, e.g.,
Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[o]nce strict scrutiny is ruled
out, the equal protection challenge fails rather quickly").
71 See Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 781-82 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Here, [plaintiff] alleges that
prison officials violated his First Amendment rights by interfering with the receipt of his mail. A
deprivation of First Amendment rights standing alone is a cognizable injury.... A prisoner is
entitled to judicial relief for a violation of his First Amendment rights aside from any physical,
mental, or emotional injury he may have sustained.") (citations omitted); Barnes v. Ramos, No.
94 C 7541, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15260, at *7-*8 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 11, 1996) ("[Plaintiff] has not
brought this suit to recover damages for mental or emotional injuries suffered as a consequence
of defendants' actions. Rather, he alleges that his constitutional rights were violated because he
was denied due process, because false charges were filed against him, and because he was sub-
Mar. 2006]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
in Robinson v. Page 2 found that the only portion of an Eighth
Amendment claim that would be barred from § 1997e(e) would be
those portions of a complaint explicitly claiming mental and emo-
tional injuries. Those "claim[s] involving another type of injury," in-
cluding non-physical injuries, would not be barred by the PLRA as
"[i]t would be a serious mistake to interpret section 1997e(e) to re-
quire a showing of physical injury in all prisoner civil rights suits.
7 3
Other courts have simply crafted a judicial exemption from
§ 1997e(e) for "significant constitutional claims., 74  In Warburton v.
Underwood, the Western District of New York found that "such claims
nevertheless deserve to be heard, and thus the [c]ourt declines to dis-
miss the Establishment Clause claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) de-
spite the fact that the only injury plaintiff could experience as a result
of a constitutional violation under the Establishment Clause would be
mental or emotional.,'
75
Since many prisoner § 1983 suits can be labeled as a "significant
constitutional claim" or be pled in such a way as to not explicitly ad-
dress emotional or mental harm but rather involve "another type of
injury," prisoners suing in these jurisdictions may escape the PLRA
without needing to argue that it violates the Fifth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause. Despite the fact that these interpretations
lead to positive results, "the interpretation cannot withstand scru-
tiny,''76 as few suits would ever fall within the purview of § 1997e (e):
Under the minority view, prisoners' claims would never be within the
statute. Insofar as prisoners' claims are within § 1983 and allege a consti-
tutional violation, prisoners' claims will never be "for mental or emo-
tional injury" but always "for the particular constitutional violation." Ac-
cordingly, such emasculation of § 1997e(e), which renders the entire
statute superfluous, must be discarded as an implausible interpretation of
77the statute.
jected to cruel and unusual punishment. For none of these claims does [plaintiff] assert that he
suffered emotional or mental harm, nor do any of these causes of action require such an allega-
tion.").
" 170 F.3d 747 (7th Cir. 1999).
71 Id. at 748; cf. Pepe, supra note 38, at 64 ("[Robinson and courts following Robinson] have
not clarified what they mean by the somewhat cryptic reference-'claims involving another type
of injury.' These other types of injury could include the constitutional deprivation itself, or
some other unspecified injury.").
" Warburton v. Underwood, 2 F. Supp. 2d 306, 315 (W.D.N.Y. 1998); see also Shaheed-
Muhammad v. Dipaolo, 138 F. Supp. 2d 99, 101 (D. Mass. 2001) (holding that § 1997e(e) does
not apply to violations of abstract rights because "the harms proscribed by the First Amend-
ment, Due Process, or Equal Protection are assaults on individual freedom and personal liberty,
even on spiritual autonomy, and not on physical well-being").
75 Warburton, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
71 Pepe, supra note 38, at 64.
77 -
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By twisting around the statutory language of the PLRA, these courts
are able to take the easy route to reach the outcomes they deem
fair-allowing constitutional torts to be adjudicated and enabling
prisoners to seek judicial redress. In doing so, however, they are
avoiding the constitutional implications of § 1997e(e)18 and the chal-
lenges in ruling on an equal protection argument.
Only a few courts have noted their constitutional concerns with
applying § 1997e(e) to civil rights actions. However, instead of en-
gaging in a Fifth Amendment equal protection analysis and deter-
mining whether the statute deserves to be struck down, those courts
have decided cases on the basis of statutory construction. For exam-
ple, the district court in Mason v. Schriro expressed its concern that an
alternative construction could turn its back on serious constitutional
violations:
If the court were to interpret section 1997e (e) to apply in cases where
prisoners alleged blatant racial or religious discrimination, there would
be grave constitutional concerns because inmates would be severely re-
stricted in the type of remedies they could seek for egregious equal pro-
tection violations. "[Wihere constitutional rights are at stake and where
Congress leaves the federal courts with authority to grant only plainly in-
adequate relief, it sets itself against the Constitution. Serious constitu-
tional questions would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny
any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim."
... If the court were to construe section 1997e(e) to preclude relief
for Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims because inmates
could only show mental and emotional injury and could not show physi-
cal injury, serious constitutional concerns would be implicated. The
court would, in effect, interpret section 1997e(e) as granting prison offi-
cials immunity from suit even where there is blatant and systematic racial
or religious discrimination.0
The court determined that rather than accepting "an interpretation
that gives rise to serious constitutional problems[,] [it would] adopt a
narrower interpretation of section 1997e(e) under which the statute
does not apply to [constitutional torts]."" While Mason is one of the
only cases in which the constitutional implications of § 1997e(e) are
78 See infra Part III for an analysis of the constitutional implications of § 1997e (e).
See Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 747 n.20 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Applying the PLRA would raise
difficult constitutional questions not previously addressed in this circuit."); Dorn v. DeTella, No.
96 C 3830, 1997 WL 85145, at *3 (N.D. Il1. Feb. 24, 1997) ("While [§ 1997e(e)'s] language un-
ambiguously bars this suit, this case is before the court without the benefit of briefing; at this
stage the court is unwilling to dismiss [plaintiff] 's complaint because this provision presents a
substantial constitutional problem that the courts have not yet addressed.").
w Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719 (W.D. Mo. 1999) (quoting Lawrence G. Sager,
Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95
HARv L. REv. 17, 88 (1981)) (internal citations omitted; alteration in original).
" Mason, 45 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
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discussed in detail, in the end the court failed to strike the provision
down on constitutional grounds. Instead, the court avoided the issue
by giving the PLRA a narrow construction that exempted the plain-
tiffs Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenge from the
purview of § 1997e(e).
Many of those courts which find that § 1997e (e) does apply to
constitutional torts also engage in a form of constitutional avoidance.
Although several courts have indeed ruled on the constitutionality of
§ 1997e(e) and found that the provision does not violate equal pro-
tection under the Fifth Amendment,"2 many other courts have
avoided detailed constitutional analysis by simply finding " that
§ 1997e(e) does not preclude nominal and punitive damages. In
Calhoun v. DeTella, for example, the Seventh Circuit held that only
compensatory damages were barred by the statute and rejected the
amicus curiae Illinois Attorney General's argument that a plain read-
ing of the statute barred the plaintiff's suit in its entirety, including
nominal and punitive damages.84 In so holding, the court stated that
" [t] his contention if taken to its logical extreme would give prison of-
ficials free reign to maliciously and sadistically inflict psychological
torture on prisoners, so long as they take care not to inflict any physi-
cal injury in the process. ' 5 Although it is not clear if a constitutional
challenge was even raised in Calhoun, the court never addressed it
and, instead, predominantly spent its analysis determining whether
the PLRA foreclosed all avenues for judicial relief. Those courts who
have been faced with a constitutional challenge state simply that the
availability of alternative remedies renders the issue moot.
12 See, e.g., Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that
§ 1997e(e) does not violate inmates' due process rights of the Fifth Amendment because the
Constitution does not guarantee a remedy for every constitutional violation); Harris v. Garner,
190 F.3d 1279, 1288-90 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding that § 1997e(e) does not violate the Fifth
Amendment because Congress only limited certain remedies and the provision is rationally re-
lated to a legitimate government purpose); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1347-
48 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding § 1997e(e) on rational basis); Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459,
462-64 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the Constitution does "not demand an individually effec-
tive remedy for every constitutional violation" and rejecting plaintiff's argument that the provi-
sion should be struck down under strict scrutiny).
" See, e.g., Oliver v. Keller, 289 F.3d 623, 629-30 (9th Cir. 2002) (determining the applicabil-
ity of § 1997e(e) to the plaintiff's claim for violation of Fourteenth Amendment rights through
an analysis of the availability of nominal and punitive damages without addressing any constitu-
tional challenge); Allah v. A1-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 252-53 (3d Cir. 2000) (reversing the district
court's dismissal of claims for nominal and punitive damages after determining that only com-
pensatory damages are barred by § 1997e(e), while failing to analyze the constitutionality of the
provision).
88 Calhoun v. DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 940 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id.
See Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Having found that compensa-
tory damages for actual injury, nominal, and punitive damages remain available, we need not
address [plaintiff's] constitutional challenge."); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 252 n.5 (3d
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In making these alternative remedies available, courts are able to
follow the mandate of the PLRA while at the same time using the
threat of a punitive damages award to avoid giving prison authorities
carte blanche to violate the constitutional rights of prisoners. How-
ever, this potential for alternative relief fails to solve the constitu-
tional problem, and § 1997e(e) continues to present significant con-
stitutional deficiencies that must be addressed by the federal
judiciary.s7
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF § 1997E(E)
While the PLRA was enacted to limit the number of frivolous law-
suits filed by prisoners challenging their conditions of confinement,8
§ 1997e(e) has gone far beyond this express purpose and has been
applied to numerous constitutional torts that can hardly be deemed
frivolous-infringement of the First Amendment right to free exer-
cise of religion, violation of the constitutional right to privacy,9° in-
fliction of psychological torture,9' retaliation for exercising First8 2 . . .83
Amendment rights, and racial discrimination. These constitutional
injuries are rarely accompanied by physical injury, yet are still funda-
mental rights protected under the Constitution.94 Instead of focusing
on whether the underlying allegation pleads a genuine constitutional
loss or whether it was filed with dishonest motives, § 199 7 e(e) con-
centrates on the type of injury the prisoner is alleging to have suf-
fered, creating a hierarchy of injuries of which only certain ones are
Cir. 2000) ("Because we conclude that § 1997e(e) does not bar Allah's claims seeking nominal
and punitive damages.., we do not reach Allah's challenge to the constitutionality of
§ 1997e(e) ....").
" See infra Part IV for an argument that the availability of alternative damages does not save
§ 1997e(e) from being unconstitutional.
" See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
'9 See Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) (applying § 1997e(e) to a
claim involving freedom of religion); Allah, 226 F.3d at 252-53 (finding that § 1997e(e) bars a
claim seeking compensatory damages for a violation of plaintiff's right to free exercise of relig-
ion).
9 See Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1345-48 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying
§ 1997e(e) to a claim involving disclosure of medical information).
9 See Harper v. Showers, 174 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that § 1997e(e) bars a
claim involving prison conditions).
9 See Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 722-26 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that a claim alleging
retaliation for filing of complaints and grievances regarding medical care was barred by
§ 1997e(e)); Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 526-36 (3d Cir. 2003) (applying § 1997e(e) to bar
a claim alleging retaliation for prisoner's filing of complaints against an officer).
93 See Todd v. Graves, 217 F. Supp. 2d 958, 959-62 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (holding that § 1997e(e)
bars a claim alleging racial discrimination, after the prison denied the inmate's requests to visit
sick mother in the hospital and to attend her funeral).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that the Constitution protects the rights of
prisoners. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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deserving of judicial attention. By denying prisoners their right to
seek redress for wrongs committed against them, the PLRA implicates
prisoners' equal protection rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Courts typically only strike down statutes violating one's equal
protection when applying a heightened level of review. By allowing
egregious constitutional violations to occur without sufficient judicial
attention and remedy based solely on the status of a prisoner,96
§ 1997e(e) deserves to be analyzed under some form of heightened
review, either through strict scrutiny or an intermediate standard. A
statute merits strict scrutiny where it either (1) burdens a fundamen-
tal right, or (2) discriminates against a suspect classy However, the
Supreme Court in pre-PLRA cases applied an intermediate review,
rather than strict scrutiny, to prison regulations that burdened pris-
oners' fundamental rights, finding that an action would be struck
down as unconstitutional unless related to a legitimate penological
interest.98
A. Section 1997e(e) Burdens Prisoners'Fundamental Right ofAccess
to the Courts
A fundamental right of access to the courts has been recognized
to ensure that prisoners may invoke judicial power to enforce or vin-
dicate their constitutional rights. The right of access under the Fifth
Amendment guarantees that prisoners are given "a reasonably ade-
" Although statutes may in theory be deemed unconstitutional under the rational basis rule,
courts rarely strike statutes down under this deferential approach. See infra notes 126-27 and
accompanying text.
Of course, those courts giving § 1997e(e) a narrow construction allow claims of funda-
mental constitutional violations to receive judicial review and compensatory remedies. See su-
pra Part II for a discussion of the constitutional avoidance engaged in by courts to escape the
deleterious effects of § 1997e(e). However, the construction given by those courts is really an
implausible interpretation that is utilized solely to bring about results that those courts deem
just. For that reason, this Comment argues that § 1997e(e) needs to be struck down as uncon-
stitutional, rather than encouraging the statutory construction given by those minority of
courts.
17 Under strict scrutiny analysis, a law is upheld only if it "advance[s] a compelling state in-
terest by the least restrictive means available." Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219 (1984).
Strict scrutiny has often been labeled "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact" due to the fact that
most statutes cannot survive strict scrutiny examination. Gerald Gunther, In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972)
(explaining the difficulty of meeting the strict scrutiny standard).
w See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text. With the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Johnson v. California, an intermediate standard will continue to be applied in prisoner cases
unless the challenge pertains to racial classifications, in which case strict scrutiny is merited.
Johnson v. California, 125 S. Ct. 1141, 1148 (2005).
99 See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977) ("It is now established beyond doubt that
prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts."); cf Pepe, supra note 38, at 73
("Without this right, the Constitution's guarantees of other fundamental rights are a nullity.").
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quate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental
rights. . ". .. ,o The right has traditionally been applied to ensure that
prisoners have access to legal assistance,101 or to prevent the prison
administration from actively interfering with prisoners' legal at-
tempts. °0
While § 1997e(e) may not technically bar prisoners from accessing
the courthouse doors, it severely limits both the plaintiffs' ability to
present their claims and the courts' authority to grant substantive re-
lief.0 3 Instead of focusing on the ability to bring an action, Jason E.
Pepe argues that
[T] he focus should be on the prisoner's ability to invoke the judicial power.
For, what is the use of getting to the courthouse, only to have the judge
conclude that there is no judicial remedy for the constitutional depriva-
tion? It is the right to have the action adjudicated that is important, not
the right to gain entry into the courthouse.
While some courts construe § 1997e(e) to preclude only certain sub-
stantive remedies, 0 5 the effect of § 1997e(e) in combination with
other PLRA provisions 6 is to so severely restrict the type of remedies
that can be sought for egregious constitutional violations that a judi-
cial forum is denied.
'm Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825, quoted in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). In order to
establish a right to access violation, the prisoner-plaintiff must demonstrate that the system's
shortcomings caused an "actual injury" and have hindered efforts to pursue a non-frivolous le-
gal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351; cf Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414-15 (2002) (hold-
ing, in a non-prisoner context, that in order to prove a claim for deprivation of the constitu-
tional right of access to courts, the plaintiff must allege both: (1) an underlying cause of action,
whether anticipated or lost, and (2) official acts frustrating litigation).
' See, e.g., Bounds, 430 U.S. at 832-33 (holding that states have an obligation to assist prison-
ers in preparing and filing legal papers by providing inmates with adequate law libraries or with
assistance from lawyers).
102 See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 491 (1969) (holding that a prison rule specifically
prohibiting prisoners from helping other inmates to prepare petitions and other legal matters
violated the fundamental right to access).
.o See Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719 (W.D. Mo. 1999) ("[W]here constitutional
rights are at stake and where Congress leaves the federal courts with authority to grant only
plainly inadequate relief, it sets itself against the Constitution.") (citation omitted) (alteration
in original).
'0 Pepe, supra note 38, at 73 (emphasis added).
'0' Those courts that construe § 1997e(e) as only denying prisoners a substantive remedy and
not precluding the underlying claim rely on Christopher v. Harbury to reject the argument that
the PLRA violates a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the court. See Christopher, 536
U.S. at 415 (holding that in order to state a constitutional denial-of-access claim, the plaintiff
must allege both an underlying claim that was precluded and a lost remedy). Therefore, in or-
der to accept that the PLRA violates the ight-to-access, one must accept that § 1997e(e) pre-
cludes not only a substantive remedy, but also precludes one from seeing his or her claim adju-
dicated.
'm See infra Part tV.B for an analysis of the effect of § 1997e(e) in conjunction with the
PLRA's attorneys' fees provision.
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B. Section 1997e(e) Burdens Prisoners'First Amendment Rights
Robert Tsai argues the existence of a fundamental right of access
under the First Amendment, 10 7 under which theory the First Amend-
ment reaches any regulation that has "the effect of burdening or dis-
couraging one's ability to pursue constitutional claims, or which pre-
sents the danger of 'distorting' the process by which constitutional
rights are adjudicated.""' Since the First Amendment safeguards
government criticism and since constitutional litigation is a form of
government dissent, the First Amendment naturally protects access to
the courts and the ability to seek redress "effectively."
In Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez"' 9 the Supreme Court struck
down a statute that, as a condition to receiving federal funds for legal
aid services, prohibited lawyers from challenging existing welfare law
on constitutional grounds. While the indigent client was still able to
engage in counseled litigation, the Court found that the statute pre-
cluded attorneys from presenting all well-grounded arguments, im-
paired the advocacy of constitutional claims, and thus violated the
First Amendment." Section 1997e(e) likewise restricts an inmate's
ability to present a constitutional claim: the provision allows a plain-
tiff to plead that a constitutional right has been violated, but prohib-
its him from arguing that he suffered an "actual injury" as a result of
this violation (unless, of course, the injury was a physical one). The
inmate, as a result of not being physically harmed, has much of his
legal arguments and theories significantly limited, if not completely
stripped away. Since § 1997e(e) has "a reasonably likely effect on the
ability of [prisoners] to articulate constitutional claims," it therefore
implicates the First Amendment, a fundamental right under Equal
Protection Clause analysis."
C. Section 1997e(e) Discriminates Against Prisoners
Because They Are Prisoners
While prisoners have always enjoyed a level of protection less than
that of non-incarcerated citizens, 12 § 1997e(e) makes prisoners sec-
ond-class plaintiffs by requiring them to have suffered physical injury
107 Tsai, supra note 8, at 889-90 (arguing that the attorneys' fees provision of the PLRA is un-
constitutional as violating the First Amendment).
'i" Id. at 885.
531 U.S. 533 (2001).
0. Id. at 545. The Court also implied that the regulation violated the separation of powers
doctrine as it invaded the function of the judiciary by foreclosing an entire area of the law from
the courts. Id.
. Tsai, supra note 8, at 888.
12 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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before litigating their constitutional suit. However, a discriminatory
statute is generally only struck down if it is aimed at a suspect class
(subject to strict scrutiny) or a quasi-suspect class (subject to an in-
termediate standard of review). Although all the United States
Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that prisoners are not a sus-
pect class," Pepe argues that prisoners should be deemed quasi-
suspect.
1 5
While being a prisoner is arguably not an immutable characteris-
tic," 6 prisoners do retain many of the other factors of a suspect group:
they are a discrete, identifiable minority who have traditionally suf-
fered from unequal treatment, public misunderstanding, and politi-
cal powerlessness. Until the 1960s, prisoners were thought to have
lost all constitutional rights as courts kept a "hands off' approach,
which allowed prisons to be run without any concern for prisoners'
constitutional rights." 7 While all incarcerated prisoners lose the abil-
ity to vote, many are permanently disenfranchised and have no clout
in the political process."8 Moreover, "It]here is evidence of a grow-
ing animus, or hostility towards prisoners," which is "derived from
public misunderstanding that prisons have become country clubs,
when in fact they are overcrowded institutions, full of violence, and
short on basic services.""' In addition, the typical prisoner enters
"' In determining whether a group qualifies for suspect class designation, the courts con-
sider the following factors: (1) whether the group exhibits obvious, immutable, or distinguish-
ing characteristics that define them as a discrete group; (2) whether they have suffered a history
of discrimination; and (3) whether they are a minority or politically powerless. High Tech Gays
v. Def. Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing Bowen v. Gilliard,
483 U.S. 587, 602-03 (1987)).
... See, e.g.,Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 585-86 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[p]isoners
are not a suspect class"); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2002) (same); Abdul-
Akbar v. McKelvie, 239 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2001) (same); Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818,
821-22 (5th Cir. 1997) (same).
"5 Pepe, supra note 38, at 76.
"6 Most courts find that being a prisoner is not an immutable characteristic in that (1) their
entry into the class is voluntary; (2) it is the result of committing a crime; and (3) they will even-
tually be released from confinement and no longer be prisoners. See Moss v. Clark, 886 F.2d
686, 690 (4th Cir. 1989) ("[1It would be ironic for the law to confer special solicitude upon a
class whose members had violated it."). But see Pepe, supra note 38, at 77 (arguing that being a
prisoner may be an immutable characteristic, as (1) many prisoners are never released from
prison; (2) some prisoners have such a high recidivism rate that they spend the majority of their
lives in prison with only brief intervals of freedom; and (3) the stigma associated with being an
ex-convict never ceases).
See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
" See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The Purity of the
Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REv. 1300, 1300 (1989) (discussing the permanent loss of political
rights of ex-convicts). Permanent disenfranchisement was held to be constitutional in Richard-
son v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974), based on the language in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment
which explicitly mentions "participation in... other crime" as an exception to the right to vote.
Id. at 42-43.
... Pepe, supra note 38, at 78 (citations omitted).
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prison already significantly disadvantaged: he is more likely than
other Americans to be indigent, uneducated, illiterate, mentally ill,
have drug addictions, be a member of a minority group, and have
previous convictions.120 As prisoners meet certain, but not all criteria
for being a suspect class, Pepe maintains that prisoners should be
deemed a quasi-suspect class, which warrants an intermediate level of
121review.
D. Section 1997e(e) Fails Under Heightened Review
Since § 1997e(e) burdens prisoners' fundamental rights and dis-
criminates against a quasi-suspect class, it should be scrutinized under
some form of heightened review. Under strict scrutiny analysis,
§ 1997e(e) easily fails: (1) the PLRA is not narrowly tailored to bar
only those frivolous lawsuits relating to conditions of confinement,
and (2) there are other reasonable means to achieve the PLRA's
purpose.22  Likewise, § 1997e(e) cannot withstand the intermediate
standard.2 3 While discouraging frivolous lawsuits in order to save ju-
dicial resources and time is a legitimate government interest, this in-
termediate level of review requires that the regulation specifically re-
late to valid penological interests. Legitimate penological interests
generally refer to concerns of prison security, administration, and re-
habilitation,124 but neither the legislative history of the PLRA nor any
' A Stigma that Never Fades, ECONOMIST, Aug. 10, 2002, at 25-26, available at http://
www.economist.com/world/na/displayStory.cfm?story-id=1270755.
" Pepe, supra note 38, at 79 (arguing that judicial scrutiny in the prisoner context should be
the same as applied in cases of government discrimination against women, who are no longer
politically powerless or discriminated by invidious motives, or aliens, who voluntarily enter into
the class).
See Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 909-10 (1986) ("[I]f there are
other, reasonable ways to achieve [a compelling state purpose] with a lesser burden on constitu-
tionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at
all, it must choose 'less drastic means.'" (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972)
(alterations in original))); see also infra Part IV for other reasonable means to limit the number
of frivolous lawsuits.
12' There are several versions of intermediate standards of review. In quasi-suspect classifica-
tions, the Court has held that the classification "must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976). However, where prison regulations burden prisoners' constitutional rights,
the Court has crafted the intermediate standard of "reasonably related to legitimate penological
interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
124 See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987) (holding that a work
detail policy preventing some prisoners from returning to the prison early to participate in reli-
gious programs was reasonably related to security and administration, as it could require the
entire work detail to return early and would result in increased security risks); Turner, 482 U.S.
at 91, 97-98 (upholding restriction on inmate-to-inmate correspondence as it was promulgated
primarily to prevent mail from being used to communicate escape plans or to arrange violent
acts, while striking down a restriction that limited prisoners' ability to marry each other because
it was not rationally related to security or rehabilitation of prisoners); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners'
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case interpreting it have ever rationalized § 199 7 e(e) as a means of
regulating prison security or administration. 125 Therefore, § 199 7e(e)
also fails under the intermediate review.
E. Section 1997e(e) Should Fail Even Under Rational Basis
Even where courts are unwilling to recognize that § 1997e (e) bur-
dens a fundamental right or impinges on a quasi-suspect class,
§ 1997e(e) still presents constitutional deficiencies under rational ba-
sis review. However, given the toothless nature of rational basis re-. 126
view, striking down § 1997e(e) under that standard is rather diffi-
cult, particularly because no circuits have done so.'27 Despite this, it is
still hard to see how § 1997e(e) is rationally related to the legislative
purpose behind the PLRA. Section 1997e(e) invites courts to find
that prisoners have been unconstitutionally stripped of their funda-
mental rights but then proceed to deny a forum for relief. The dis-
tinction between which claims merit judicial attention and which do
not is based solely on the nature of the injury and not on the severity
or unconstitutionality of the wrong. The prisoner who was "fortu-
Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 130-32 (1977) (holding that bans on inmate union meetings
and union solicitation through bulk mail were reasonably related to objectives of prison ad-
ministration and security).
" Even if there is a potential relationship between § 1997e(e) and penological interests, any
justification articulated by the government would be post hoc:
There is a possible basis for concluding that § 1997e(e) may implicate these penological
interests. Shuttling prisoners back-and-forth from the courthouse certainly impacts
prison administration and security.... There is no support, however, for this rationaliza-
tion in the legislative history of § 1997e(e). Insofar as the Court has in the past rejected
post hoc rationalizations.., so too should the Court reject any attempt to ground
§ 1997e(e) in concerns for prison administration or security.
Pepe, supra note 38, at 75-76.
126 See Gunther, supra note 97, at 8 (describing rational basis as being "minimal scrutiny in
theory and virtually none in fact"). Under rational basis review, a statute will be upheld if it is
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose, "even if [it] seems unwise or works to the
disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous." Romer v. Evans, 517
U.S. 620, 632 (1996). This standard has been deemed "a paradigm of judicial restraint" as
courts will uphold statutes if there is any "reasonably conceivable state of facts that could pro-
vide a rational basis." FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 314 (1993) ("[E]qual
protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative
choices.").
-27 See, e.g., Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1290 (11th Cir. 1999) ("Under this lenient stan-
dard of review, section 1997e(e) easily passes muster."); Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d
1342, 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting the equal protection argument under rational review);
Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 1997) ("Congress' stated purpose to limit frivolous
lawsuits rationally supports its action in adopting § 1997e(e)."). The same result has occurred
with other provisions of the PLRA. See, e.g.,Jackson v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 331 F.3d
790, 799 (lth Cir. 2003) (upholding the attorneys' fees provision under rational basis review);
Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 598 (7th Cir. 2003) (same); Imprisoned Citizens Union v.
Ridge, 169 F.3d 178, 189-90 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding the consent decree provision under ra-
tional basis); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365, 373-74 (4th Cir. 1996) (same).
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nate" enough to suffer withdrawal, panic attacks, chest pains, and dif-
ficulty breathing as a result of being denied medications is eligible for
damages, 28 whereas the prisoner who was excluded from religious
services, prevented from following religious dietary laws, denied reli-
gious counseling that conformed with his beliefs, and then retaliated
against for attempting to assert his First Amendment rights is ineligi-
ble for damages.
Congress asserts that the purpose behind § 1997e(e) is to save ju-
dicial resources by limiting frivolous and meritless lawsuits. However,
finding that the nature of an injury demonstrates whether a claim is
frivolous or meritorious is an irrational method for determining
which cases are deserving ofjudicial attention. The only possible jus-
tification for the drawing of such an arbitrary line is the fear that
mental and emotional damages are harder to judge and thus easier to
fabricate. However, this argument was squarely rejected by the Court
in Carey, which found "no particular difficulty in producing evidence
that mental and emotional distress actually was caused."' Instead,
the Court found that juries, when given appropriate instructions, are
competent to judge mental distress because such injuries are "evi-
denced by one's conduct and observed by others.'' 31 With the only
potential basis for a connection already struck down by the Court,
there is simply nothing rational about using the nature of an injury as
a mechanism to weed out frivolous lawsuits.
IV. THE AVAILABILITY OF NOMINAL OR PUNITIVE DAMAGES DOES NOT
SAVE § 1997E(E) FROM UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Courts applying § 1997e(e) to constitutional torts generally reason
that because of the availability of alternative judicial remedies, pris-
oners are still given "a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts,"
and therefore are not denied equal protection under the laws.
132
These courts further reason that since Congress created statutory
remedies for constitutional violations by enacting § 1983, Congress
' See Ziemba v. Armstrong, No. 02CV2185, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 432, at *7 (D. Conn. Jan.
14, 2004) (finding a claim for damages from the denial of mental health medications that leads
to physical consequences is not precluded by § 1997e(e)).
See Allah v. A-Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that a prisoner's claim stem-
ming from emotional or mental injury as a result of a First Amendment violation is barred by
§ 1997e(e)).
'0 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263 (1977).
1'1 Id. at 264 n.20.
12 Zehner v. Trigg, 133 F.3d 459, 463 (7th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,
350 (1996)).
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may also limit those remedies in the prisoner context.13 However,
the district court in Zehner v. Trigg acknowledged that "[t]here is a
point beyond which Congress may not restrict the availability of judi-
cial remedies for the violations of constitutional rights without in es-
sence taking away the rights themselves.'' s4  Section 1997e(e) goes
beyond this point.
A. Prisoners Rarely Receive the Alternative Relief, Making Its Availability an
Empty Promise
The availability of punitive or nominal damages for constitutional
violations seems to be more of an exercise in dicta than in reality.35
While a punitive damages award would certainly serve its purpose of
punishing prison administrators for violating a prisoner's constitu-
tional rights and deterring such future behavior, r 6 the reality is that
few cases are actually awarded such damages. 137 Indeed, a key feature
of punitive damages is that they are never awarded as a matter of
right, regardless of how egregious the defendant's conduct.3 8  In-
stead, punitive damages may be awarded for outrageous conduct
committed because of a defendant's evil motive or reckless indiffer-
"' See Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318, 1330 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that Congress is
not required to enact a damages remedy for emotional or mental injury because of its inherent
power to limit available remedies); cf Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (holding
that there is no constitutional right to a remedy against private entities where Congress has not
provided one, where the plaintiff has alternative tort remedies and full access to remedial
mechanisms, and where the suit would not deter individual officers from committing future
unconstitutional acts).
"' Zehner, 952 F. Supp. at 1331. Despite this pronouncement, however, the district court still
found § 1997e(e) to be constitutional, as other remedies remained available.
'5 Many courts also leave open the possibility of equitable relief, but this too is rarely
awarded because the claim is frequently moot by the time it arrives before the court. Since "an
actual controversy must be extant at all stages of the case, not just at the time the complaint is
filed," many times a prisoner has been transferred, the defendant-prison guard no longer works
at the prison, or the prisoner has been released and thus no longer merits equitable relief.
Thompson v. Carter, 284 F.3d 411, 415 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Beyah v. Coughlin, 789 F.2d
986, 988 (2d Cir. 1986)); see, e.g., Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 724-25 (8th Cir. 2004) (deny-
ing injunction because defendant no longer worked at the prison); Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226 F.3d
247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding that equitable relief was moot as the prisoner had been trans-
ferred to another prison); Harris v. Garner, 190 F.3d 1279, 1283-84 (lth Cir. 1999) (holding
that § 1997e (e) does not apply to prisoners who have been released).
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. a (1979) ("The purposes of awarding
punitive damages.., are to punish the person doing the wrongful act and to discourage him
and others from similar conduct in the future."); see also Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura,
477 U.S. 299, 307 n.9 (1986) (discussing the purpose behind punitive damages in constitutional
torts).
137 See, e.g., Royal, 375 F.3d at 724-25 (affirming trial court's denial of punitive damages); Cas-
tle v. Clymer, 15 F. Supp. 2d 640, 668-69 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (denying punitive damages despite
finding of retaliation for participating in a First Amendment-protected activity).
'm See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 51-52 (1983) (discussing the high threshold required to
prove punitive damages).
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ence to the rights of others.3 9 "If the plaintiff proves sufficiently seri-
ous misconduct on the defendant's part, the question whether to
award punitive damages is left to the jury, which may or may not make
such an award.' 4 0 In requiring the plaintiff to meet this high thresh-
old of reckless indifference, and then allowing an award to be discre-
tionary even if that high standard is met, most prisoners are denied
punitive relief.
Royal v. Kautzky'4 1 exemplifies this. The plaintiff, who was bound
to a wheelchair from a spinal cord injury, filed a pro se complaint al-
leging that he was not receiving proper medical treatment.4 Shortly
following the filing, the prison medical director confiscated the plain-
tiff's wheelchair and claimed that it was no longer needed. As a re-
sult, the plaintiff was forced to either use crutches while in severe
pain or crawl on the floor.'4 3 Although the wheelchair was finally re-
turned after the prisoner submitted seventeen complaints, the plain-
tiff was soon thereafter placed in segregation for sixty days."4 Even
though the district court found that the prison had unconstitutionally
retaliated against the plaintiff, there was no accompanying physical
injury and thus, compensatory damages were barred by § 1997e (e). 45
The court then decided against awarding punitive damages, find-
ing that the defendant did not act with evil motive or reckless indif-
ference but rather out of frustration with plaintiffs constant com-
plaints. 6 The court further noted that since the head of security had
already retired, punitive damages would not deter future conduct.
4 7
Recognizing that a lower court decision may only be reversed for
abuse of discretion, 4 s the court of appeals affirmed the decision and
the plaintiff was denied both punitive and compensatory damages,
39 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) ("Punitive damages may be
awarded for conduct that is outrageous, because of the defendant's evil motive or his reckless
indifference to the rights of others.").
'o Smith, 461 U.S. at 52 (quoting DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 204
(1973)) (emphasis added).
41 Royal, 375 F.3d 720.
14 Id. at 726 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
,41 Id. After plaintiff was seen crawling, the security director issued a memorandum stating
that any inmate seen crawling on the ground would be subject to discipline. Id. at 726-27.
" Id. at 727.
145 Id. at 722-23 (majority opinion).
... Id. at 725.
147 Id.
"' Id. at 724 ("An appellate court should not lightly reverse a district court's decision to
award-or not to award-punitive damages .... Because a district court's decision to award
punitive damages involves 'a discretionary moral judgment,' we empower a district court with
enough discretion to make its proper judgment call without fear of inappropriate appellate in-
tervention.").
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despite the finding that an egregious constitutional violation was
committed against him. 149
While courts are more likely to award nominal damages, there still
remains the issue of whether the plaintiff must plead nominal dam-
ages in order to avoid dismissal or summary judgment. While many
courts have indeed found that it is unnecessary for a plaintiff to spe-
cifically request nominal damages, other jurisdictions have required
the prisoner to include the request in the pleadings or at least in the
appellate brief.'50 In Harris v. Garner, for example, the court refused
to consider nominal damages where the plaintiff had not sought
them,'5' and the suit was dismissed despite compelling allegations of
Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations that occurred
during a prison "shakedown.' 52
The dismissal of a potentially meritorious action, based on the
plaintiffs failure to plead nominal damages, is especially critical given
the number of prisoners who proceed without the assistance of coun-
sel.' s These plaintiffs presumably are unaware of the existence of
nominal damages as a tool for vindicating constitutional rights and
are ignorant of the necessity of pleading nominal damages to keep
their claims alive. Realistically, most prisoners would not want to be
awarded just $1.00, and so few would have any incentive to include a
request for nominal damages without knowing of its greater signifi-
cance. In those courts requiring the plaintiff to raise the issue, the
fact that nominal damages may in fact be available is of no impact be-
cause the pro se litigant is already out of court, regardless of the po-
tential merits of the lawsuit.
B. An Award of Nominal Damages Does Not Support Attorneys' Fees and
May Preclude a Prisoner from Having Counsel
In the typical civil rights lawsuit, the prevailing plaintiff is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorneys' fees. 54  By contrast,
Id. The district court did, however, award plaintiff a $1.00 nominal damages award. Id.
See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
'5' 190 F.3d 1279, 1288 n.9 (11 th Cir. 1999).
52 Id. at 1282 (alleging specifically that prison officials allowed members of the opposite sex
to be present during strip searches and body cavity searches, physically harassed prisoners,
made harassing comments to an inmate because of his sexual orientation, ordered one prisoner
to tap dance naked, and ordered another prisoner to dry shave).
'53 See JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS, 1980-96, at 2 (1997) (stating that more than 90% of inmates petitioning district courts
filed pro se and 88% did so on appeal); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 62 (reporting that
96% of prisoners proceed pro se).
'54 See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
[the civil rights statutes] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a rea-
sonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.... ."). Section 1988 has been treated as asymmetric:
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§ 1997e(d) (2) of the PLRA limits an award of attorneys' fees to 150%
of the monetary damages award.' Since a plaintiff who recovers
nominal damages is considered to be the prevailing party,16 a pris-
oner who receives a nominal award falls under the attorneys' fees
provision of § 1997e(d) (2). 5 7 For example, a prisoner awarded $1.00
as a remedy for a non-physical constitutional violation finding would
be awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of $1.50.158 This insulting
result simply feeds into the irrationality of § 1997e(e).
Since Congress chose to deviate from the default American Rule
by enacting § 1988 in the first place, 59  courts upholding
§ 1997e(d) (2) find that Congress similarly has the authority to limit
the fees that a court may award in prisoner civil rights cases.'60 How-
ever, in applying § 1997e(d) (2) to nominal damages awards, the
courts have forced prisoners to lose their most powerful mechanism
for obtaining counsel. While it is true that the fee cap provision does
not make it impossible in all cases for a prisoner to obtain legal ser-
vices, 6' the provision does destroy a critical incentive for lawyers to
a prevailing plaintiff is to be awarded attorneys' fees in all but special circumstances, whereas a
prevailing defendant is generally not to be awarded fees unless the plaintiffs action was frivo-
lous, unreasonable, or filed with bad faith. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S.
412, 422 (1978) (noting that a plaintiff should not have to pay the defendant's attorneys' fees
unless his or her claim was frivolous or meritless or was pursued after it became apparent that
the suit was groundless).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(2) (2000) ("Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an ac-
tion.., a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the
amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not
greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.").
' See Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-13 (1992) (holding that in order to qualify as the
prevailing party, a plaintiff must obtain at least some relief and obtain an enforceable judgment
against the defendant; finding that since a nominal damages award is a technical victory and
still enables the plaintiff to enforce ajudgment, a plaintiff awarded nominal damages is the pre-
vailing party).
'5' See Volk v. Gonzalez, 262 F.3d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the PLRA's attor-
neys' fees provision applies to awards of nominal damages); Boivin v. Black, 225 F.3d 36, 40 (lst
Cir. 2000) ("Since an award of $1.00 is just as much a monetary judgment as an award of
$1,000,000, the plain language of the statute makes the fee cap applicable to such an award.").
' See, e.g., Royal v. Kautzky, 375 F.3d 720, 726 (8th Cir. 2004) (affirming the district court's
award of $1.50 in attorneys' fees); Boivin, 225 F.3d at 38 (remanding to cap the attorneys' fees at
$1.50).
' Under the American Rule, a prevailing party in tort litigation must bear 100% of his own
attorneys' fees. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("In
the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a reasonable attor-
neys' fee from the loser."). However, "Congress has the power.., to revise this schematic, and
if it elects to do so, it may delineate both the circumstances under which attorneys' fees are to
be shifted and the extent of the courts' discretion in that respect." Boivin, 225 F.3d at 39.
See Boivin, 225 F.3d at 39.
'6, See id. at 43 ("[T]he PLRA fee cap does not make it impossible for a prisoner to secure the
services of a lawyer.... [W]e are reluctant to conclude that all attorneys accept or reject pris-
oners' cases solely on the basis of financial considerations. Moreover, prisoners may hire attor-
neys with their own funds.").
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take on prisoner constitutional tort cases, thereby creating an addi-
tional impediment on the prisoner who already has many cards
stacked against him. The result is that an attorney may only take on
cases where the prisoner has been physically injured, ignoring other
constitutional cases that are just as meritorious and deserving ofjudi-
cial attention. And even when a prisoner is able to secure counsel,
the restriction on fees reduces any incentive a lawyer has to expend
significant yet necessary resources and time, thereby affecting the
quality of representation.1
62
Two undesirable outcomes may occur where a prisoner is unable
to obtain counsel. First, the prisoner may be forced to forgo litiga-
tion altogether.1 63 While this may seem to be exactly what Congress
desired in enacting the PLRA, Congress's express intention was to
limit the amount of frivolous lawsuits while leaving the courts open to
prisoners with sincere allegations of constitutional violations. T6 Viola-
tions of one's constitutional rights are seen in America as the most
serious torts (as is made evident by the fact that Congress exempted
civil rights cases from the American Rule in the first place), and are
of particular interest to the federal judiciary. 65  Such violations
should not be considered less serious because the person whose con-
stitutional right was stripped happens to be a prisoner.
Second, by reducing attorneys' fees to practically nothing, the
courts will simply see an increase in the amount of pro se litigation.
While 6pro se plaintiffs are held to less demanding pleading stan-
dards16 and do occasionally achieve success,1 67 the vast majority of pro
se lawsuits fail. 16  The presence of counsel, on the other hand, dra-
162 See Tsai, supra note 8, at 894 (arguing that attorneys working for indigent clients with no
prospect of attorneys' fees will have little incentive to litigate the case effectively).
' However, the Seventh Circuit in Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582 (7th Cir. 2003), discussed
Congress's belief that litigation is recreation to prisoners, trips to the courthouse are like vaca-
tion, and prisoners are lured by the belief of a "pot o' gold" at the end of litigation. Id. at 592.
If Congress's belief is indeed true, then few prisoners would be deterred from suing without
counsel.
' See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text.
Cf. Legal Serv. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 545 (2001) (finding that a statute that
bars constitutional issues from being presented to the courts severely impairs the judiciary func-
tion as "[i] nterpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission of the judici-
ary").
' See Boivin, 225 F.3d at 43 ("While pro se litigants are not exempt from procedural rules,
courts are solicitous of the obstacles that they face. Consequently, courts hold pro se pleadings
to less demanding standards than those drafted by lawyers.").
67 See Newman, supra note 30, at 519 n.2 (describing instances where prisoners' rights have
been recognized and upheld), cited in Boivin, 225 F.3d at 43 (demonstrating that simply because
a prisoner brings a suit pro se does not automatically mean that the prisoner does not have a
meaningful opportunity to succeed).
' See Newman, supra note 30, at 519.
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matically improves success rates. 169 Lawsuits brought pro se are not,
and should not be, a preferred method of litigating constitutional
violations, particularly as pro se litigation has the effect of substan-
tially slowing the litigation process:
If without counsel, [prisoners] litigate untrained in procedure and suspi-
cious of the judicial system. Prison administrators, the usual defendants
in these actions, are often too busy keeping a lid on their underfinanced
and volatile institutions to litigate responsively to court deadlines. They
are represented by attorneys general who may defend through "paper-
ing" the plaintiff and the court with motions. The burden of sorting
through the unprofessional pleadings of the plaintiff and the dilatory
pleadings of the defendant falls upon the court, slowing the litigation
process to a halt.
170
Given that the PLRA was enacted to free up the federal judiciary's
docket so that it could focus on non-prisoner lawsuits, it would seem
that a provision that effectively encourages pro se litigation runs
counter to that purpose.
C. Section 1997e(e) 's Prohibition on Compensatory Damages Runs Counter
to the Damages Structure of Constitutional Torts
Although § 1983 constitutional torts are a "species of tort liabil-
ity,"' 7' they are still governed according to common law tort damages
principles. 72 The Supreme Court first set forth this basic structure in
Carey v. Piphus,'13 holding that compensatory damages do not flow
from every deprivation of constitutional rights. Rather, damages are
to be awarded where the plaintiff succeeds in proving that the defen-
dant both violated a constitutional right and caused an actual in-
jury. 74 In satisfying both elements, an award of compensatory dam-
' See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 28, at 692 (reporting that prisoners assisted by attor-
neys succeed in fifty-three percent of cases); Robertson, supra note 18, at 144 (noting that the
presence of counsel dramatically improves the prisoner's potential for success).
"0 Herbert Eastman, Draining the Swamp: An Examination of Judicial and Congressional Policies
to Limit Prisoner Litigation, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 64, 70-71 (1988) (citing Larsen v. Sie-
laff, No. 76-3162, slip op. at 2 (E.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 1977) (denying the Illinois Attorney General's
motion to dismiss where the filing seemed to be based solely on a dilatory motive and finding
that the effect of "assembly-line motions, while perhaps temporarily relieving the burden of
government counsel, have done nothing more than temporarily shift the burden [to] the court
which must rule on the motion")).
... Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305 (1986).
' Under common law, damages only flow from injury or the invasion of a legally-protected
interest. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 902 (1979) (defining damages as "a sum of
money awarded to a person injured by the tort of another").
,7, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
174 Id. at 264; see also Stachura, 477 U.S. at 307-08 (affirming Carey and emphasizing the im-
portance of proving an actual injury for § 1983 damages); cf Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534
U.S. 61, 67 (2001) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the Court should recognize a federal
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ages is mandatory, and the jury is required to award the amount ap-
propriate "to compensate the plaintiff for his loss.'''75 On the other
hand, where a defendant has deprived the plaintiff of an absolute
constitutional right but has not caused an actual injury, the plaintiff's
rights should be vindicated through an award of nominal damages.
176
Punitive damages may likewise be awarded apart from showing actual
injury as a mechanism to punish the defendant for his willful or mali-
cious conduct and to deter others from similar behavior.1
77
However, the actual injuries required to justify an award of com-
pensatory damages are not limited to physical injuries and its associ-
ated out-of-pocket losses and other monetary harms. Rather, they in-
clude such injuries as "impairment of reputation..., personal
humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering."'178 Carey specifically
held that distress-mental suffering or emotional anguish-is a genu-
ine injury recognized by the law.'7  The Court, while acknowledging
that mental and emotional distress may be harder to prove than
other types of injuries, found the difficulty of proof was not so sub-
stantial as to justify rules different from other types of injury."" The
concurrence in Stachura further held that deprivation of a First
Amendment-protected activity could itself constitute compensable in-
jury wholly apart from mental or emotional injury.'8'
In enacting § 1997e(e), Congress significantly changed the land-
scape of the constitutional tort's remedies structure. Under the
PLRA, compensatory damages are now available only for preferred
types of actual injuries-property, physical, or physical plus emo-
tional or mental injuries. Emotional or mental distress, which Carey
explicitly declared to be injuries recognized by the law, is no longer
deemed an actual injury when it occurs in the prisoner context. Dep-
rivation of First Amendment rights, which may be considered an in-
jury, is likewise deemed by the majority of courts a non-injury for
remedy at law whenever there has been a constitutional deprivation and refusing to confer a
private right of action for remedies against private entities acting under color of federal law).
T Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52 (1983).
176 Carey, 435 U.S. at 266 ("By making the deprivation of such rights actionable for nominal
damages without proof of actual injury, the law recognizes the importance to organized society
that those rights be scrupulously observed; but at the same time, it remains true to the principle
that substantial damages should be awarded only to compensate actual injury .. ").
177 See Stachura, 477 U.S. at 306 n.9 (providing that punitive damages are available upon a
showing of the requisite intent).
78 Id. at 307 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974)).
Carey, 435 U.S. at 264 n.20.
Id. at 263-64 (noting that distress is typically proved by showing that the nature and cir-
cumstances of the wrong were such that it had an effect on the plaintiff).
"' Stachura, 477 U.S. at 315 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Loss of such an opportunity [to en-
gage in demonstration to express political views] constitutes loss of First Amendment rights 'in
their most pristine and classic form.' There is no reason why such an injury should not be com-
pensable in damages." (quoting Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963))).
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purposes of compensable damages. Whereas courts are required in
the non-prisoner context to award compensatory damages when an
actual injury is proved, the PLRA mandates the opposite: courts must
now dismiss compensatory claims where the prisoner alleges certain
actual injuries.
While the courts rationalize this result by finding that nominal or
punitive damages remain available, they are still altering the princi-
ples as set forth in both common law tort doctrine and constitutional
civil rights. The very purpose behind nominal damages is to vindi-
cate one's constitutional rights where no harm has been inflicted.
1 8 3
Section 1997e(e) ignores this structure, instead treating certain inju-
ries flowing from constitutional violations as non-harm for purposes
of nominal damages.
Carey and its progeny focus on the importance of ensuring the
availability of an adequate and appropriate remedy proportional to
the loss sustained. The PLRA, in allowing only limited remedies,
drives a huge hole through this constitutional tort structure. Given
that § 1997e(e) operates in and affects an area of law so fundamental
to the United States, such an exception mandates that there be a sig-
nificant countervailing reason. However, the PLRA fails to present a
sufficient counterargument. While limiting frivolous lawsuits in or-
der to preserve resources for legitimate claims is indeed a valid con-
cern, § 1997e(e) was enacted based on a number of half-truths of the
actual need to curb prisoner litigation 84 and does not ensure that
such purpose will actually be accomplished. By considering only
physical injury to be worthy of judicial attention, Congress ignores
that a vast number of egregious violations of rights, deemed funda-
mental under the Bill of Rights, are not accompanied by physical in-
jury. Section 1997e(e) does succeed in eliminating prisoner law-
..2 See, e.g., Searles v. Van Bebber, 251 F.3d 869, 876 (10th Cir. 2001) ("The underlying sub-
stantive violation, like [a] First Amendment wrong, should not be divorced from the resulting
injury, such as 'mental or emotional injury,' thus avoiding the clear mandate of § 1997e(e).
The statute limits the remedies available, regardless of the rights asserted. . . ."); Allah v. Al-
Hafeez, 226 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Allah relies on... the Stachura opinion as support
for the proposition that a jury could measure the value of the infringement on his constitu-
tional rights without basing it on any mental or emotional injury.... [Elven assuming ar-
guendo that presumed damages are available for a First Amendment free exercise claim, that
claim would still be 'for mental or emotional injury suffered' under the facts as alleged in this
case and would be barred by § 1997e(e) absent a showing of prior physical injury.") (internal
citations omitted).
"' See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 907 cmt. a (1979) ("When a cause of action for a
tort exists but no harm has been caused by the tort... judgment will be given for nominal dam-
ages.").
' See supra note 26 for a discussion of how the prisoner litigation "explosion" was not quite
as large as it initially appeared, due to a failure to correct for the increasing prison population.
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suits,""s but also eliminates numerous cases that are neither frivolous
nor wasteful of judicial resources. Indeed, § 1997e(e) forces the fed-
eral judiciary to turn a blind eye to the constitutional torts structure
in many situations where an appropriate remedy is deserving.
V. THE PURPOSE BEHIND § 1997E(E) MAYBE ACCOMPLISHED
THROUGH ALTERNATIVE METHODS
Federal courts must strike § 1997e(e) down as unconstitutional.
This not only includes those courts currently applying the provision
to constitutional torts, but also applies to those minority of courts
who have allowed certain constitutional claims to survive § 199 7 e(e)
through statutory construction rather than constitutional analysis.
18 6
In ruling that § 1997e(e) is unconstitutional, courts are not depriving
the legislature of a mechanism for reducing the number of frivolous
prisoner lawsuits. Under the PLRA, judges are given a greater gate-
keeper function in inmate cases than in non-prisoner suits, having
more latitude to immediately dismiss on their own accord a com-
plaint that seems frivolous, malicious, or does not state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. 87  While the legislative history of the
PLRA indicates that Congress's concern with "overzealous" judges
who "have gone too far in micromanaging our Nation's prisons"88 led
them to enact the PLRA in order to take discretion away from federal
judges, Congress may not overstep its bounds. Rather, Congress must
place faith in the ability of federal judges to dismiss those lawsuits
that truly are frivolous or malicious while keeping alive those that
state a legitimate constitutional claim. Furthermore, since prisoners
already face a higher standard for constitutional claims than non-
prisoners face, 89 judges must keep this in mind when determining
whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief may be
granted. With this higher burden, more prisoner lawsuits will be re-
1' The decrease in prisoner filings between 1995 and 1997 was thirty-three percent. This
occurred notwithstanding a ten percent increase in the prisoner population. Margo Schlanger,
Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1634 (2003) ("The most dramatic effect of the PLRA
on individual inmate cases has been the decrease in district court filings coded.., as inmate
civil rights cases.... [Tihe PLRA seems to have achieved its major goal of shrinking the num-
ber of civil rights filings by inmates.").
"' While the efforts to exempt constitutional torts from the purview of § 1997e(e) are laud-
able, those courts have avoided the constitutional issue by giving § 1997e(e) an implausible
construction that renders the provision superfluous. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying
text. Statutory construction, therefore, is an improper mechanism for allowing prisoners to
redress violations of their constitutional rights.
117 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c) (2000).
141 CONG. REC. S14, 418 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
"' See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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leased from court without having to resort to stripping prisoners of
their rights.
Furthermore, judges have the ability to revoke an inmate's good
time credit as a sanction for filing a malicious claim, filing a claim
solely to harass the defendant, testifying falsely, or presenting false
evidence.' 90 Given that the majority of prisoners bringing suit are in-
digent and simply could not pay a fine, this non-monetary sanction is
a powerful disincentive to any prisoner who wishes to file suit solely to
spend time outside the prison walls or to gain retribution against his
prison guards. Finally, the PLRA's requirement that the prisoner first
exhaust all administrative remedies may be an effective mechanism to
ensure that the lawsuit is truly filed because of a legitimate com-
plaint.'9 ' This provision also works to settle issues the prisoner has
with his conditions of confinement without necessitating the in-
volvement of the courts."'
CONCLUSION
While many courts declare that § 1997e(e) only precludes prison-
ers from seeking compensatory damages for violations of their rights,
§ 1997e(e) goes beyond precluding this particular remedy by strip-
ping the ability to adjudicate many prisoners' legitimate claims. This
availability of nominal or punitive damages does not save § 1997e(e)
from unconstitutionality. The PLRA, as construed by the majority of
jurisdictions, restricts the availability of judicial remedies for viola-
tions of constitutional rights to the point where Congress is "in es-
sence ... taking away the rights themselves by rendering them utterly
'w 28 U.S.C. § 1932 (2000) ("In any civil action brought by an [inmate], the court may order
the revocation of such earned good time credit.., if... the court finds that (1) the claim was
filed for a malicious purpose; (2) the claim was filed solely to harass the party against which it
was filed; or (3) the claimant testifies falsely or otherwise knowingly presents false evidence or
information to the court.").
'9' See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 525 (2002) (discussing how internal review filters out
frivolous claims and clarifies the contours of the controversy for those cases ultimately brought
to court).
112 See id. (finding that by allowing corrections officials time and opportunity to address com-
plaints internally, prison administration may be improved and the complaining inmate may be
satisfied by the change, thus entirely obviating the need for judicial involvement). There is,
however, a concern that this provision allows prisoners to be increasingly subjected to the power
of prison administrators to retaliate against them for filing grievances. Cf Gill v. Pidlypchak,
389 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding that the prisoner-plaintiff stated a First Amendment
claim for being subjected to retaliation by prison officials after filing grievances); Trobaugh v.
Hall, 176 F.2d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir. 1999) (directing award of compensatory damages for a pris-
oner being placed in segregation in retaliation for filing grievance). The administrative re-
quirement, therefore, can only be enforced where prisoners have the ability to bring claims for
unconstitutional retaliation free from the physical injury requirement of § 1997e(e); otherwise
prisoners would face being retaliated against for following § 1997e(a), but be precluded from a
judicial remedy by § 1997e(e).
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hollow promises.' 93 In denying prisoners who have not been physi-
cally harmed an adequate remedy for their constitutional depriva-
tions, Congress has created a huge gap in constitutional civil rights
doctrine-the most fundamental area under American federal law.
Freeing the federal judiciary docket to preserve critical resources for
legitimate claims is a valid concern. However, this aim may be com-
pleted through alternative methods that do not raise such significant
constitutional implications.
... Mason v. Schriro, 45 F. Supp. 2d 709, 719 (W.D. Mo. 1999).
Mar. 2006]
